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Do Required Minimum Distribution 401(k) Rules Matter, and For Whom? 
Insights from a Lifecycle Model 
 
US tax law has long required older Americans to withdraw a stipulated minimum fraction 
from their tax-qualified retirement account balances each year, and then pay tax on the income 
withdrawn. Moreover, if the retiree withdraws too little during the taxable year, she must pay a 
50% excise tax on the under-withdrawn amount. Known as the Required Minimum Distribution 
(RMD) Rule, the starting age of this mandatory withdrawal policy was initially set at age 70.5, 
with the minimum withdrawal fraction from the account balance rising with age reflecting the 
account owner’s remaining life-expectancy (IRS 2015). The rationale for an RMD policy was that 
contributions and investment earnings in both tax-qualified employer sponsored 401(k) plans and 
Individual Retirement accounts (IRA) were tax-exempt until the money was withdrawn.1 If, 
however, the retirement saver died prior to drawing down her entire account, the remaining assets 
would pass to her heirs who could stretch distributions over their own (probably longer) lifetimes 
and potentially result in much lower tax revenue collected.2 Accordingly, the RMD rule was 
implemented to get retirement account owners to pay more income tax on their pre-tax 
contributions and investment earnings before their deaths. As Mortenson, Schramm, and Whitten 
(2019) pointed out, since RMDs happen in the distant future, these seek to limit the cost of tax 
subsidies designed to encourage retirement saving without adversely impacting their intended 
                                                            
1  RMD rules apply to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA) and most employer sponsored defined contribution plans 
(such as 401(k) and 403(b) plans); the latter may be rolled over to IRAs when the participant retires. We do not 
consider Roth accounts in this paper; Roth account holders are not subject to RMD rules, though their beneficiaries 
usually are. 
2 The 2019 SECURE Act required that inherited qualified retirement accounts for non-eligible designated beneficiaries 
be paid out over a maximum of 10 years, instead over their life expectancies as under the old law (Gradisher and 
Tassell-Getman 2020; Hartman 2020). Eligible designated beneficiaries, including a surviving spouse, a minor child, 
and other individuals not more than 10 years younger than the deceased owner, can still stretch after death distributions 
over their own lifetimes.  
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effect, which is to enhance old age security of private households through the accumulation and 
decumulation of retirement assets.3 
The SECURE Act of 2019 recently extended the age for required minimum distributions 
to age 72, and several advocates seek to raise it even more, to age 75 (Waddell 2019; Kapadia and 
Hershberg 2020). For instance, in October of 2020, House Ways and Means Committee Chairman 
Richard Neal (D-MA) and Ranking Member Kevin Brady (R-TX) proposed the “Securing a Strong 
Retirement Act of 2020,” boosting the RMD age to 75. The previous year, key members of the 
Senate Finance Committee, Sens Rob Portman (R-Ohio) and Ben Cardin (D-Md.) offered the 
“Retirement Security and Savings Act of 2019,” which would have eliminated the RMD for 
retirees having retirement assets worth less than $100,000 in aggregate,4 an approach called a 
“progressive RMD.” Moreover, a full abandonment of the RMD rules may become a reality, 
according to some analysts (Berry 2020).   
Softening the RMD restrictions is intended to make retirement savings more attractive to 
private households. Nevertheless, since “RMDs are [intended] to generate taxable income from 
these distributions, it probably won’t help the federal deficit if they push the age back,” according 
to financial adviser Malito (2018: np). Indeed, the US Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT 2019) 
estimated that federal tax revenue would fall by $8.9 billion over the period 2019-2029, as a result 
of simply raising the RMD age to 72.  
Whether and how Americans might respond to a further RMD deferral, or indeed the rule’s 
abolition, is the subject of this paper. To investigate potential outcomes on various decision 
variables of private households, we develop and solve a realistically-calibrated lifecycle model 
                                                            
3 For a historical discussion of RMD rules in the United States, see Warshawsky (1998). 




with taxable and tax-deferred retirement accounts that allows also to evaluate the implications on 
tax-payments to the government of alternative RMD rules. Specifically, we measure the 
anticipated impact on work hours/retirement patterns, saving/consumption patterns, and 
contribution/withdrawal paths in tax-qualified accounts. This allows us to measure both potential 
direct and indirect effects on optimal withdrawal behaviour resulting from the restrictions 
established by the proposed changes in RMD rules. Our research, therefore, contributes to the rich 
literature on financial decisionmaking of private households (see Gomes, Haliassos, and 
Ramadorai 2020 for an overview) using dynamic consumption and portfolio choice models in 
discrete time (see Gomes 2020 for an overview), initiated by Cocco et al. (2005) and Gomes and 
Michaelidis (2005). Specifically, we build on and extend prior work by Gomes, Michaelidis, and 
Polkovnichenko (2009) on tax-deferred retirement accounts by including endogenous labour 
supply (as Gomes et al. 2008) and claiming decisions of social security benefits (as in Hubener et 
al. 2016), while undertaking a detailed consideration of the taxation of withdrawals. We extend 
the existing empirical literature on the impact of RMD rules (Brown, Poterba, Richardson 2017 
and Mortenson et al. 2019) by providing new additional insights from our theoretical life cycle 
model. In addition, we contribute to the current and ongoing policy debate on the efficient 
decumulation of the $20 trillion in assets (ICI 2020) held in tax-qualified defined contribution 
retirement plans, by analyzing the economic implications of altering the RMD rules.5  
We show that delaying the RMD age further would have little impact during the worklife, 
including on workers’ savings and asset allocation inside and outside tax-qualified retirement 
accounts. Additionally, social security claiming behavior is almost unaffected. By contrast, 
significant changes are observed for distributions from tax-qualified accounts during the retirement 
                                                            
5 Early empirical research on IRA withdrawals is available in Sabelhaus (2000).  
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period, depending on whether older people have a bequest motive or not. For those lacking a 
bequest motive, the RMD rules are not particularly restrictive, as optimal expected withdrawals 
from 401(k) plans are substantially higher than the RMD pattern required by the IRS. This 
conclusion holds for the RMD-70 as well as at ages 72 and 75; we also show that even under a 
progressive RMD, people’s withdrawal behavior and therefore tax-payments would change little. 
By contrast, when the retiree has a bequest motive, results are rather different. The age-70 RMD 
rule proves quite restrictive, since many individuals would prefer to make fewer withdrawals than 
required and use the 401(k) plans as a tax-favored tool to transfer financial wealth to the next 
generation. We also show that when the RMD age is delayed to 72 or 75, the sum of lifetime tax 
payments is not much affected, even for persons with a bequest motive. By contrast, if RMD rules 
were applied only to retirement assets in excess of $100,000, as under the progressive RMD 
approach, or were completely suspended, this would result in notably lower lifetime tax payments 
by high-income individuals having a bequest motive.   
In what follows, we develop and calibrate a discrete time lifecycle model using US data 
for utility-maximizing workers with endogenous work hours, retirement behavior, 
consumption/saving, and portfolio choice including risky stocks and bonds held in and outside a 
tax-deferred retirement plan. The model embeds exogenous background risks (labor income, 
capital market, out-of-pocket medical expenditures), heterogeneity of income profiles and 
preferences, realistic rules on income taxes, and regulations regarding social security benefit 
claiming options. Just as importantly, the model also integrates real-world rules characterizing tax-
qualified 401(k) accounts including pre-tax contributions, employer matches, and RMD 
withdrawal amounts.6 Our results using calibrated baseline parameters agree closely with observed 
                                                            
6 An unpublished working paper closely related to ours by Stuart and Bryant (2020) also builds a structural lifecycle 
model to investigate the impact of RMD withdrawal penalties on Individual Retirement Account (IRAs). While their 
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U.S. household saving and social security claiming ages. We then use this realistic calibrated life 
cycle approach to generate optimal consumption/savings, work/retirement patterns, and portfolio 
allocations in a baseline case and compare results across different RMD scenarios. 
 
Model and Calibration  
Time budget, labor income, and retirement benefits. Our lifecycle model assumes a representative 
worker making annual decisions from age 24 (𝑡𝑡 =  0) until her maximum age of 100 (𝑇𝑇 = 76). 
This worker can allocate up to (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) = 0.6 of her available time budget to paid work (assuming 
100 waking hours per week and 52 weeks per year). Depending on her work effort (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) and 
the wage rate 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡, her yearly before-tax labor income during her worklife is:  
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 = (1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡) · 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 .    (1) 
The uncertain wage rate 𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 = 𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡 · 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 · 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡 consists of an age-dependent deterministic component 
(𝑤𝑤𝑡𝑡), an uncertain permanent component 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑡𝑡 · 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡+1 with independent lognormal distributed 
shocks 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡~𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(−0.5σP2 ,σ𝑃𝑃2), and a transitory shock 𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡~𝐿𝐿𝑁𝑁(−0.5σU2 ,σ𝑈𝑈2 ) assumed uncorrelated 
with 𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡. We assume heterogeneous individuals and calibrate the deterministic components of the 
wage rate process and variances of the permanent and transitory wage shocks separately for six 
groups, namely men and women of three educational levels: less than High School (<HS), High 
School graduate (HS), and at least some college (Coll+). The estimation procedure draws on the 
1975–2015 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (see Appendix A). 
                                                            
model-simulated outcomes match IRA withdrawal data provided by the IRS, their setup is less rich than ours. Unlike 
in this paper, they do not include endogenous work hours, social security claiming decisions, portfolio decisions, 
exogenous shocks from risky stocks, and out-of–pocket medical expenditures. They also eschew heterogeneity 
analysis, while our results allow six different income profiles (by sex and education), preferences (bequest/no bequest), 
and three exogenous shocks (stocks, medical expenditures, and labor income).      
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Between ages 62 ≤ 𝐾𝐾 ≤ 70, the individual may retire from work and claim social security 
benefits which results in a yearly retirement income (𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝐾) of:  
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐾𝐾 ⋅ 𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾 ⋅  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡+1                                (2) 
Old age retirement benefits depend on the retiree’s Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) and an 
adjustment factor 𝜆𝜆𝐾𝐾 for early or delayed claiming. Thus, the 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 =  min [0.9𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴; 9,666 +
0.32(𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 10,740); 26,954 + 0.15(𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 − 64,764); 36,500] in 2018 was a piecewise 
linear function of (12 times) the worker’s average indexed monthly lifetime earnings (AIME). If a 
worker claims benefits at the system-defined Normal Retirement Age of 66, the PIA replaces 90% 
of the first $10,740 of average lifetime earnings, plus 32% of earnings between $10,740 through 
$64,764, plus 15% of earnings over $64,764 up to the cap ($128,400).7 An adjustment factor 
permanently decreases (increases) benefits if an individual claims benefits before or after the 
Normal Retirement Age of 66. More specifically, the factors we use are {𝜆𝜆62 = 0.75; 𝜆𝜆63 =
 0.8; 𝜆𝜆64 =  0.867; 𝜆𝜆65 = 0.933; 𝜆𝜆66 = 1.0; 𝜆𝜆67 = 1.081; 𝜆𝜆68 = 1.16; 𝜆𝜆69 = 1.24; 𝜆𝜆70 =
1.32}. Finally, the variable 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  is a independent lognormal distributed transitory shock 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡  ~LN(−0.5𝜎𝜎ℇ
2,𝜎𝜎ℇ2), which reflects out-of-pocket medical expenditure shocks in retirement (as 
in Love 2010). If the individual works beyond age 62, the model stipulates that she must devote at 
least one hour per week, and our model rules out overtime work in retirement (0.01 ≤ 1 − 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 ≤
0.4). 
Wealth dynamics and budget constraint. The individual can use current cash on hand for consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡, 
investments in risky stocks 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0, riskless bonds 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0, and contributions 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ≥ 0 to employer sponsored 
                                                            
7 We use 2018 parameter levels; as these increase with inflation each year (US SSA nd_a b), our model focuses on 
real rather than nominal values. Following Chai et al. (2011), the PIA is approximated using permanent income in the 
optimization. In the simulation of optimal life cycles, we use the 35 best years of earnings to specify the PIA and 
adjust the corresponding permanent income state.  
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tax-deferred qualified 401(k) plans which are taxed according to an EET-regime: that is, workers can deduct 
contributions to retirement accounts from taxable income up to a yearly limit,8 earn pre-tax investment 
earnings in their accounts, and pay income tax on withdrawals during retirement (when the marginal tax 
rate is usually lower than during the worklife). After retirement at age 𝐾𝐾, no further contributions may be 
made into 401(k) plans 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 0 (𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝐾). Hence, cash on hand 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 in each year is given by: 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡.    (3) 
One year later, cash on hand is the value of stocks (bonds) having earned an uncertain 
(riskless) gross return of 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1 (𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓), plus income from work after age-dependent housing costs ℎ𝑡𝑡 
(as in Love 2010), plus withdrawals (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡) from the retirement plan, minus taxes (𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1): 
 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 = [𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓](1 − 𝑓𝑓) + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1 − ℎ𝑡𝑡) + 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑡𝑡+1.    (4) 
Our financial market parameterizations assume a risk-free rate of 1% and lognormal 
distributed stock return ln(𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡) ~𝑁𝑁(0.05; 0.18) with a mean of 5% and a return volatility of 18%. 
For assets outside the tax-qualified retirement account, we assume a yearly management fee of 
𝑓𝑓 = 1% to reflect the (usually) higher cost of retail investment compared to employer-sponsored 
retirement plans. As in Lusardi, Michaud, and Mitchell (2017), if a worker’s cash on hand falls 
below 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡+1 ≤ $5,879 p.a., the model posits that she receives a minimum welfare benefit of $5,879 
the next year. 
Individuals must pay three kinds of taxes: payroll, federal income, and penalty taxes for 
non-compliant withdrawals from 401(k) accounts. Payroll taxes are proportional to the worker’s 
annual earnings, amounting to 11.65% until retirement (the sum of 1.45% Medicare, 4% city/state 
                                                            
8 Our model uses a yearly own contribution limit of $18,500 until retirement regardless of age; the 2018  IRS constraint 
permits additional catch-up contributions of $ 6,000 for those over age 50. 
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tax9, and 6.2% social security contributions up to a cap). After retirement, social security and 
Medicare contributions are generally no longer paid. In addition, both workers and retirees pay 
federal income taxes that depend on taxable income and the corresponding progressive marginal 
tax rates for each of the seven tax brackets (parameters as per 2018). Own contributions into a 
401(k) plan reduces the worker’s taxable income (see online Appendix B), while withdrawals from 
401(k) plans increase it. A penalty tax of 10% is payable on withdrawals from 401(k) accounts 
prior to age 59½ (𝑡𝑡 = 36), and a penalty of 50% applies if withdrawals are less than required under 
the RMD rule. Inherited assets are tax-exempt.10 
Tax deferred retirement accounts and RMD rules. The worker’s assets in the tax-qualified retirement plan 
are invested in a portfolio of risky stocks and bonds. Letting 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠 ≥ 0 be the relative exposure to equity, this 
portfolio generates a gross portfolio return of 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘)= 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1 + (1 − 𝜔𝜔𝑡𝑡𝑠𝑠)𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓. In addition to the benefits 
from deferred taxation, we assume that employers match 100% of employee contributions up to 5% of 
yearly gross labor income, so that the 401(k) plan is able to avoid complex non-discrimination testing.11 
Due to tax regulation (as of 2018), the matching rate is only applied to a maximum compensation of 
$275,000, so the overall matching contribution is given by 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = min(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 , 0.05𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 , $13,750).  After 
retirement, no additional own contributions are possible (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ,𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 = 0).  Prior to the endogenous retirement 
age 𝑡𝑡 = 𝐾𝐾, the total value (𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1) of retirement assets at time 𝑡𝑡 + 1 is determined by the previous period’s 
value minus any withdrawals (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡+1), plus additional own contributions (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡), plus any employer 
match (𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡), and returns on stocks and bonds.  
                                                            
9 State and local taxes vary widely across the states (e.g. 0% Texas; 13.3% California) and municipalities, so our 
parameter is an average that we add to the payroll tax for simplicity’s sake. 
10 Current U.S. law does not require the filing of an estate tax return for gross assets of less than $11.58 million for 
persons dying in 2020. Eligible designated beneficiaries do not have to pay estate tax on inherited IRA assets and can 
defer payment of income tax. 
11 See Willson (2019) for a discussion of 401(k) safe harbor plans. Love (2007) reports a value of 100% matching to 
6% in US defined contribution plans. 
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From a given starting age onwards (𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎), plan participants must take payouts from 
the retirement account each year, defined as a certain fraction (𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡) of the account value according 
to the Required Minimum Distribution rules. This required fraction is increasing with age and is 
calculated as 1 divided by the distribution period specified in the IRS Uniform Lifetime Table (IRS 
2015).12 For the starting age 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎, we consider three cases: age 70 (consistent with the rules 
in place until 2019); age 72 (as implemented in 2020); and the recent proposal to raise the RMD 
age to 75. Withdrawals below the RMD threshold lead to a penalty tax of 50% on the under-
withdrawn amount, taken directly from the 401(k) account. The dynamics for the retirement 
account evolve as follows: 







⎧(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − Wt + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 + 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡)𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘)                                       𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝑡𝑡 <  𝐾𝐾            
(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − Wt)𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘),                                                            𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑡𝑡 <  𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
(𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 − Wt)𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1
401(𝑘𝑘) − max (0.5(𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡−𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡), 0),         𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓  𝑡𝑡 ≥  𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 
 
    
Additionally, we also consider the progressive RMD case, where the 𝑊𝑊𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 rises to 75 but the 
withdrawal rule applies only to those with tax-qualified retirement accounts worth over $100,000.  
Preferences and numerical solution. The worker derives utility from a composite good consisting of 
consumption 𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡 and leisure time 𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 (normalized as a fraction of total available time), modelled by the time-




. After retirement, the individual enjoys full leisure 
(𝑙𝑙𝑡𝑡 = 1). The parameter 𝛼𝛼 measures leisure preferences; 𝜌𝜌 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion; and 𝛽𝛽 
the time preference factor. In addition, she receives utility from bequeathing financial wealth after she dies 
                                                            
12 If an individual remains employed at the same firm at which she has her retirement plan, she need not take an 
RMD until she stops working.  
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to the next generation, from both her tax-qualified and regular saving accounts 𝑄𝑄𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝑡𝑡 + 𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡. The 
parameter 𝑏𝑏 ≥ 0 measures the strength of her bequest motive. The recursive definition of the value function 









 � , 
   (6) 
with terminal utility  𝐽𝐽𝑇𝑇 =
(𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇)1−𝜌𝜌
1−𝜌𝜌




.  Age-specific annual survival probabilities 𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡 
(𝑝𝑝0 = 1 and 𝑝𝑝𝑇𝑇 = 0) for males and females are taken from the US population life table in the 
National Vital Statistics Report (Arias 2010). 
We posit that individuals with/without a bequest motive in each of the six subgroups 
(male/female, with education levels <HS, HS, and Coll+) maximize the value function (6) subject 
to the constraints and calibrations set out above, by optimally selecting their consumption, work 
hours, social security claiming ages, contribution/withdrawals from tax-qualified 401(k)-plans, 
401(k) equity exposures, and investments in stocks and bonds in non-tax-qualified accounts. The 
numerical procedure to generate the optimal policy functions in each period assumes a four-
dimensional discrete state space grid 35(X)×25(𝐹𝐹)×8(P)×9(K), with 𝑋𝑋 being cash on hand, 𝐹𝐹 
referring to 401(k) assets, P permanent income, and K the claiming age. 
Calibration of preference parameters. We believe it is important to calibrate such a rich lifecycle 
model to both financial and non-financial data. Accordingly, calibration of preference parameters 
(assumed unique for each of the six sex/education subgroups) follows the procedure outlined in 
Horneff et al. (2020a). We aim to ensure that the model outcomes simultaneously match empirical 
claiming rates reported by the US Social Security Administration (US SSA 2015), as well as 
average assets in 401(k) plans reported for 7.3 million plan participants in EBRI (2017). For each 
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of the subgroups, we solve the lifecycle model under the tax regime and social security rules in 
place in 2015 (i.e. using RMD 70), generate 200,000 simulated independent lifecycles using 
optimal feedback controls, and calculate average claiming rates and 401(k) account balances (with 
respect to three exogenous random variables: stock returns, permanent, and transitory income 
shocks). These six subgroups are then aggregated to obtain population mean values using National 
Center on Education Statistics (NCES 2016) weights.13 Repeating this procedure for alternative 
sets of preference parameters (𝜌𝜌,𝛽𝛽,𝛼𝛼) assuming 𝑏𝑏 = 0 generates a coefficient of relative risk 
aversion 𝜌𝜌 = 5, a time discount rate  𝛽𝛽 = 0.96, and a leisure parameter 𝛼𝛼 = 1.3 which closely 
match simulated model outcomes as well as empirical evidence on both average assets in tax-
qualified retirement accounts and social security claiming ages (see Appendix B). Specifically, the 
model generates a large peak at the earliest claiming age of 62, along with a second peak at the 
(system-defined) Full Retirement Age. Our model also matches the current distribution of 401(k) 
wealth by age rather nicely. 
Next, we again use these calibrated preference parameters to solve for the optimal lifecycle 
policies and generate simulated optimal outcomes for the six subgroups, but this time we 
implement the 2018 tax and social security rules. The number of simulations for each subgroup 
depends on NCSE (2016) population weights by sex and education, generating a representative 
distribution of outcomes for the overall population. For comparison purposes, this procedure is 
followed for the same heterogeneous households with and without a bequest motive 𝑏𝑏 = 2, in line 
with parameters reported in prior lifecycle studies.14 The simulated lifecycle outcomes 
(consumption, income, work-hours, retirement ages, 401(k)-contributions/withdrawals/wealth, 
                                                            
13 Specifically, the weights are 50.7% female (61% with Coll+, 28% with HS, and 11% with <HS), and 49.3% male 
(57% with Coll+, 30% HS, and 13% <HS). 
14 See Gomes and Michaelides (2005) and Love (2010). 
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stocks/bonds, tax payments) of these two groups are then the basis for our comparisons in the 
policy analyses below. 
 
What Would Delaying the RMD Age Do? 
In what follows, we compare the expected optimal outcomes from the lifecycle model for 
several different RMD rules. The first set of results adopts the RMD start age of 70 (RMD-70), in 
effect before 2020.15 Our second analysis implements the new start age of 72 (RMD-72) effective 
from 2020; the third assumes that the RMD age is 75 (RMD-75); and last, we posit an age-75 
RMD age applied only to accounts with assets over $100,000 (RMD-75 & W>100K). Table 1 
shows average outcomes for the overall population in terms of claiming ages, work hours, 401(k) 
assets, assets in non-qualified accounts, and consumption over the life cycle. Column A (on the 
left) represents results for workers without a bequest motive, and Column B (on the right) for those 
having a bequest motive. 
Table 1 here 
For households with no bequest motive, Column A of Table 1 shows that delaying the 
RMD start age from 70 to 72 or 75, or even applying it only to accounts over $100,000, has little 
effect on expected lifecycle patterns, both during the worklife and in retirement. That is, the 
average social security claiming age remains at age 64.9, work hours average around 34 per week, 
and average yearly consumption stands at around $26,000 during the worklife (age 25-61) and 
$23,000 in retirement (age 62-100).  Moreover, asset accumulation changes only slightly: workers 
have on average $1,000 less in their 401(k) accounts with RMD-75 rules, versus the other two 
other cases. No major changes are identified for the assets held in non-qualified accounts. Overall, 
                                                            




we conclude that, for households lacking a bequest motive, none of the proposed RMD reforms 
makes retirement savings more attractive. That is, they neither accumulate more wealth during the 
worklife, nor do they increase consumption during retirement. 
More substantive changes are evident when people with bequest motives face the various 
RMD scenarios. Comparing Columns A and B, we find that individuals with a bequest motive 
tend to claim old age benefits from social security about 0.4 years later, work three hours more per 
week, accumulate about $30,000 more in 401(k) plans, and hold $5,000 more in non-qualified 
plans, for all of the RMD settings. The fact that these individuals work more, retire later, and 
accumulate more assets indicates that they not only wish to bequeath to their heirs, but they also 
consume more in retirement. The explanation is twofold. First, longer working hours and later 
claiming lead directly to higher social security benefits. Second, additional accumulated assets to 
fund the desired inheritances lead to larger investment income that can also be used for more 
consumption. 
 Moreover, a comparison of results across the RMD settings in Column B shows that 
claiming ages, work hours, and consumption are again virtually unchanged across the scenarios, 
but there are remarkable differences in retiree wealth patterns for those desiring to leave a bequest.  
By the end of the worklife, there are no appreciable differences in accumulated assets across the 
four RMD scenarios. Even in the retirement phase, the differences between the age 70, 72, and 75 
RMD rules are less than 1% for both assets inside and outside tax-qualified accounts. Yet the 
progressive RMD rule substantially boosts average assets in retirement accounts late in life (age 
92-100), to about $43,000, or $10,000 (30%) greater than in the RMD 70 case, while  non-qualified 
accounts are much reduced in later life, by about $8,000 (50%); see boxed values in Table 1. 
Accordingly, retirees with a bequest motive retain more assets in their 401(k) accounts when the 
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progressive RMD rule is in effect, indicating that the tax-qualified retirement accounts are a more 
effective instrument to finance bequests than are non-qualified accounts. This occurs for two 
reasons. First, the 401(k) is a tax free transfer of assets to the next generation, and second, assets 
in retirement account earn higher returns due to lower fees. Simultaneously, retirees use more of 
the assets in their non-qualified accounts to finance consumption late in life, which for the 
progressive RMD generates essentially the same consumption as do the other rules.  
To sum up: Individuals having a bequest motive retain more assets in their 401(k) plans to 
finance their bequests. The progressive RMD rule enables this more flexibly than would occur 
simply by delaying the RMD start age. Yet for individuals with no bequest motive, they do not 
build up more retirement saving under the progressive RMD rule. Accordingly, an increase in 
lifetime utility from relaxing the RMD rules can only be expected for households seeking to leave 
an inheritance.       
 
How Restrictive Are the RMD Rules? 
Thus far, we have shown that delaying the RMD age has little impact on households’ 
expected behavior if they lack a bequest motive, whereas people desiring to leave a bequest will 
seek to withdraw less from their 401(k) accounts than currently. Next, we investigate whether 
RMDs serve as a binding constraint restricting optimal withdrawal behavior, and for whom. On 
the one hand, as mentioned by Brown et al. (2017), RMD rules only constrain qualified account 
holders who would prefer to withdraw less from their account balances than the rules prescribe. A 
bequest motive or a large growth in retirement assets resulting from very high stock returns could 
support this argument. On the other hand, retirement accounts are designed to support old-age 
consumption, and lifetime utility maximizing retirees may wish to distribute more than the RMD 
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amounts. Mortenson et al. (2019) pointed out that the RMD schedule is modest, since the implied 
remaining life-expectancies used in the regulations are higher than those from actual mortality 
tables. For example, the remaining life expectancy or distribution period at age 75 according the 
IRS uniform table is 22.9 years, which translates into an RMD of 1/22.9 = 4.4% of account 
balances. Yet the remaining life expectancy according to the US population table (used in our 
utility function) is much lower, about 13 years for females and 11 years for males, which translates 
into withdrawal rates of 7.7% and 9.1%, respectively. An additional argument supporting higher 
than required withdrawals is the low risk-free interest rate of 1% versus the subjective discount 
factor of 4% used in the utility function. 
Expected versus required minimum withdrawals. To investigate this on a quantitative basis, we 
calculate the difference (𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 − 𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡) between the actual 401(k) withdrawals predicted by the 
lifecycle model minus the withdrawals required by each RMD rule, for all simulated optimal 
lifecycle paths. Figure 1 illustrates the differences, where individuals lacking a bequest motive are 
depicted in the first row, and those with a bequest in the second. Column A (on the left) traces 
expected differences in withdrawals for the RMD-70, -72, and -75 rules, while Column B (on the 
right) compares differences under the RMD-75 rule and the progressive rule applied to 401(k) 
accounts holding over $100,000 (RMD-75 & W>100K).  
Figure 1 here 
Results in the first row of Column A are clear: specifically, people with no bequest motive 
optimally withdraw substantially more from their retirement accounts throughout retirement, 
compared to what each of the RMD rules requires. Additionally, all of the curves decline with age, 
since as the retiree spends from her account, her 401(k) balance falls with age. We also see that 
the withdrawal differentials are very similar for all three RMD ages, with the main difference being 
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the age shift resulting from different RMD starting ages. A similar picture emerges in Column B. 
The difference between optimal versus required withdrawals is initially much higher for the 
progressive RMD approach (gray line) versus the RMD 75 rule (black line). This is not due to 
lower average withdrawals, but instead to the lower RMD required payouts resulting from the 
$100,000 exemption limit. Nevertheless, the difference again converges with age, because assets 
held in the retirement accounts decline. Accordingly, we conclude that the regulatory minimum 
RMD withdrawal rules are not particularly restrictive for retirees lacking a bequest motive. These 
individuals intend to spend all of their assets by the time they pass away, so as to generate a 
constant lifetime utility stream from consumption, and the best way to achieve that goal is to 
withdraw enough along the way. Any remaining assets transferred to the next generation are 
random, depending on whether the retiree dies early or late. 
Somewhat different conclusions emerge from the second row of Figure 1, where we 
compare optimal minus RMD withdrawals for retirees having a bequest motive. In the left graph, 
expected optimal withdrawals again exceed those under the age-based -70, -72- and -75 RMD 
rules, and again, the difference declines with age. Yet under the RMD -72 and -75 rules, the initial 
differential is notably higher than under the RMD-70 rule. For example, the retiree’s first 
withdrawal under the RMD-72 rule exceeds the required minimum by $4,000; for the RMD-70 
rule starting two years earlier, the corresponding value at the same age is only $3,000 (or 8% 
lower). A similar finding applies to the RMD-75 rule. In other words, under the later RMD ages, 
retirees withdraw less until they are required to, and then they make larger withdrawals later from 
the larger remaining assets in their 401(k) plans. Nevertheless, this differential is only temporary 
as it disappears with age due to rising required withdrawals as remaining life expectancy falls. A 
much more notable difference arises under the progressive RMD rule, in the second row of Column 
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B. Specifically, the differential grows with age between the optimal withdrawal for the RMD-75 
rule versus the progressive RMD. Even at fairly advanced ages, the retiree retains substantially 
more assets in her retirement account and pays no penalty tax. In other words, these retirees use 
their tax-qualified retirement accounts as a means to pass financial assets to the next generation. 
Probability distribution of withdrawal rates. A more granular look at this result is provided by 
investigating the probability distribution of optimal withdrawals for the RMD-75 and RMD-
75&W>100K rule generated from 200,000 simulated lifecycle patterns. Figure 2 reports the 
relative frequencies of optimal withdrawals as a fraction (in 0.5% increments) of retirement 
account balances for retirees at ages 75, 85, and 95. Row 1, which depicts results with no bequest 
motive, shows that for all scenarios, the probability mass is broadly distributed over the entire 
spectrum of possible withdrawal ratios. In most of the cases, the retiree wishes to withdraw more 
than the RMD rule prescribes (reflected by the arrows). For example, the RMD-75 rule requires a 
75-year-old retiree to withdraw 4.4% from her retirement account. There is only a moderate peak 
in the probability mass of 3.2% around this withdrawal rate, while the mode of this distribution is 
a much higher withdrawal rate of 9.5%. By age 95, the RMD-75 rule requires a withdrawal of 
11.6% of the account, while the distribution’s modal withdrawal rate is 100%. The relative 
frequencies for the progressive RMD-75 rule (column B of row 1) are also very broadly distributed 
over the various withdrawal rates, with no peak around the RMD-age-based fractions. Overall, 
then, we conclude that the RMD rules are not binding for retirees lacking a bequest motive.  
Figure 2 here 
A completely different picture emerges for the RMD-75 rule when retirees do have a 
bequest motive (row 2o, column A). In all cases, the modal payout value corresponds to the 
required RMD fraction, and the probability mass increases significantly with age. For example, at 
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age 75, about 20% of retirees withdraw the required minimum fraction of 4.4%. Few retirees take 
out less than required, and those who take out more, do so at a moderate rate. If retirees survive to 
age 85 (95), about 40% (75%) follow the RMD payout rule. This underscores the result that people 
prefer to withdraw less than the required minimum fractions, yet the high penalty taxes prevent 
them from doing so. Accordingly, our result confirms Mortenson et al.’s (2019) empirical finding 
that there is a high concentration of probability mass for withdrawals around the RMD levels. In 
other words, we find theoretically (and those authors conclude empirically) that the RMD turns 
out to be a binding constraint for many people. The fact that our theoretical results match up with 
evidence on real-world retirement plan participants’ withdrawal patterns can therefore be 
interpreted as evidence that many retirees take plan payouts as though they have a bequest 
motive.16   
The situation would change significantly for retirees with a bequest motive if the 
progressive RMD-75 were to be implemented only for account values above $100,000 (row 2, 
column B). Many retirees now elect withdrawal rates well below the RMD rule, and indeed the 
modal value stands at a withdrawal rate of 0% for all three age groups. For example, about 35% 
of retirees surviving until age 95 take no withdrawals. Evidently, these individuals seek so far as 
possible to utilize the RMD exemption limit of $100,000, to pass on money to heirs that is largely 
untaxed and which has earned higher returns after costs. 
A final look at this result is provided by calculating the probabilities that an individual 
following optimal lifecycle behavior will withdraw less than the RMD amount conditional on still 
being alive. In this case, it will be recalled that the retiree would need to pay the 50% penalty tax 
                                                            
16 Additional factors explaining the high correspondence between empirical and regulatory minimum withdrawal 
rates might include behavioral (non-expected utility) preferences or optimization constraints, but such factors are 
beyond the framework of our model. 
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on any withdrawal shortfalls. Results for the three education levels of interest and the overall 
population are reported in Table 2. Without a bequest motive (Column A), individuals at all 
education levels are quite unlikely to withdraw less than required. For example, the likelihood of 
paying a penalty tax for retirees having a college education and no bequest motive amounts to only 
2.7% under the RMD-70 rule, and just 2.5% for the RMD-72 rule. For people with less education 
(≤ High School), the probabilities still remain low. In other words, households lacking a bequest 
motive generally wish to avoid the 50% penalty, so they take at least as much as the RMD rules 
require. If anyone in this group pays penalty taxes at all, it is coincidental: for example, if there 
are unusually high stock returns, 401(k) asset values can rise sharply along with the RMD amounts 
that must be withdrawn. At the same time, the retiree will not wish to withdraw her full RMD to 
avoid depleting her retirement account too quickly, in case the market subsequently drops. In the 
progressive RMD case, the probability of paying the penalty is essentially zero for members of all 
education groups.  
Table 2 here 
For households with a bequest motive (Column B), the chance that a retiree would 
optimally elect to withdraw less than the RMD starting at ages 70, 72, or 75 rises to 6-12%, 
depending on the subgroup. In fact, some households would even willingly pay the penalty tax to 
favor the bequest over own consumption. Yet as we see, this rarely happens, since most retirees 
withdraw at least the amounts required under the RMD rules. Again, penalty probabilities are 
essentially zero in the progressive RMD case. 
These results thus support the conclusion that households having a bequest motive are those 
most likely to be constrained by RMD rules. They do their best to use tax-advantaged retirement 
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accounts not only for old age consumption, but also to fund an inheritance. By contrast, households 
lacking such a motive are hardly constrained at all by RMD rules such as those examined here. 
 
Implications for Lifetime Tax Payments 
  We next explore the potential impact of delaying RMD ages for tax payments over the 
lifecycle. Using the simulated optimal lifecycle profiles for the six subgroups, we calculate for 
each individual 𝑖𝑖 the income tax payments (including penalty taxes)  𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 from age 70 (𝑡𝑡 = 46) to 
the maximum age 100 (𝑇𝑇 = 76). To obtain a representative distribution for the total population, 
we weight the 200,000 simulation paths for males/females in each of the education groups (<HS, 
HS, Coll+) by population weights. To reflect mortality risk, we multiply tax payments by the multi-
year survival probability that the individual is still alive at this age  𝑝𝑝0,𝑡𝑡 =  ∏ 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡𝑗𝑗=0 . Formally, this 
is defined as:  
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡
𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝑝𝑝0,𝑡𝑡 · 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ,    (7) 
and it reflects the probability distribution of annual income tax payments per individual at a certain 
age. We perform this analysis for each of the four RMD approaches considered, only for 
households having a bequest motive. To evaluate the implications of the different RMD rules for 
income tax payments, we calculate the (cross-sectional) mean value and the 99% quantile 
(wealthiest 1 percentile) at each age. Results in Figure 3, Column A (left side), compare results for 
the RMD-70, the RMD-72, and the proposed higher starting age RMD-75. Column B (right side) 
compares the RMD-75 (black line) with the progressive RMD-75 rule (gray line). 
Figure 3 here 
Expected tax payments appear in the top row of the Figure. On the left, compared to the 
old RMD-70 (blue line) rule, tax payments under the RMD-72 rule (black line) are lower between 
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age 70 and 72. This is because retirees make fewer withdrawals from their 401(k) accounts in this 
window. Starting from age 72, tax payments due with the RMD-72 rule are now somewhat higher 
(as seen in Figure 1). This results from a “catch-up” effect: as more assets remain in the 401(k) 
plan until age 72, the withdrawals and thus the tax payments are higher when the RMD-72 rule 
takes effect. Accordingly, tax payments between age 70 and 72 are postponed to the later RMD 
age. Actual income tax shortfalls occur only if the individual dies in the meantime. Exactly at age 
72, the blue and black lines intersect; thereafter, households pay more taxes, on average, under the 
new RMD-72 than under the old RMD-70 rule, until age 85. In fact, simply looking at the 
differences between the two lines suggests that the RMD-72 scenario actually generates more tax 
revenue over the lifecycle compared to the old RMD 70 rule. Nevertheless, this is only true for 
households with a bequest motive.      
This catch-up effect would also apply if the RMD age were further postponed to age 75, as 
is evident in Figure 3. Now, the black line (RMD-75) intersects the blue line (RMD-70) at age 75 
and remains above it until about age 80. In general, households with an inheritance motive pay 
less taxes until age 75 and more thereafter. Nevertheless, as can be seen in the right panel of 
Column B, top row, the “catchup” effect disappears under the progressive RMD approach. Retirees 
with a bequest motive use the $100,000 exemption limit to leave assets in their 401(k) plans 
without fear of penalty taxes, resulting in lower tax payments at all ages.   
The second row of Figure 3 (left) illustrates the effects for the 1% of the people paying the 
highest tax (the 99% quantile). Here the catch-up effect becomes even clearer: the dashed line 
(RMD-72) intersects the blue line (RMD-70) at age 72 and remains above it until about age 80. A 
similar pattern applies for a RMD age of 75. Again, the catch-up effect disappears under the 
progressive RMD-75 rule (right panel), as lower taxes are paid at all ages.   
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We next investigate whether, over the remaining lifetime from age 70 to 100, the catch-up 
effect fully compensates for the initial tax losses resulting from postponing the RMD starting age. 
To this end, we calculate the sum of expected tax payments between ages 70 and 
100,∑ 𝐴𝐴(𝑝𝑝0,𝑡𝑡 · 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)100𝑡𝑡=70 , as well as various quantile measures ∑ 𝑄𝑄𝑎𝑎(𝑝𝑝0,𝑡𝑡 · 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡)100𝑡𝑡=70 .17 Using these 
metrics, we also evaluate the resulting effects on tax payments if the progressive RMD rule were 
adopted. Finally, we examine how total tax revenues would change if the RMD were to be fully 
abolished (w/o RMD). Results appear in Table 3, where Panel A contains households without and 
Panel B with a bequest motive.   
Table 3 here 
A first finding is that, for households lacking a bequest motive (Panel A), the catch-up 
effect is insufficient to compensate for initial tax losses resulting from postponing the RMD start 
age of 70 to later ages. Both the mean and quantile tax loss values for the later RMD ages are 
generally equal to or below those under the RMD-70 rule.  Moreover, tax losses are even larger if 
the RMD rule were to be abandoned entirely. Comparing the columns labeled w/o RMD and RMD-
70, tax losses are the highest though they are still relatively moderate: the mean is 3% lower 
(=4.48/4.62-1), and the value is 4.5% lower for the 99% quantile highest income taxpayers 
(=107.47/112.08-1).   
Our conclusions change for households having a bequest motive. Specifically, Panel B of 
Table 3 shows that the catch-up effect under the RMD-72 approach is so large that it actually 
results in somewhat higher tax payments than under the RMD-70 rule: that is, average taxes paid 
                                                            
17   We also calculate the remaining tax-payments over simulated trajectories  𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑥𝑥𝑆𝑆𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚70,𝑖𝑖 = ∑ 𝑝𝑝0,𝑡𝑡 · 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡100𝑡𝑡=70 . The 





increase from $5,080 to $5,130 per person. This is mostly attributable to more taxes paid by the 
highest-income retirees, as can be seen from the 95% and 99% quantiles. Nevertheless, the catch-
up is too small under the RMD-75 rule to compensate for the initial lower tax payments, though 
the differences are modest. Under a progressive RMD plan, or if RMDs were eliminated altogether, 
tax payments would fall more substantially. In particular, high-income retirees (Q99%) use the 
401(k) account to bequeath money to their heirs, so as a consequence, tax payments decline by 
about 7% relative to taxes collected under the current RMD-72 rule (=118.93/125.95-1). 
 
Conclusions  
We use a calibrated lifecycle consumption and portfolio choice framework embodying 
realistic institutional considerations to explore how Required Minimum Distribution rules shape 
individuals’ saving patterns, social security claiming ages, and withdrawals from their tax-
qualified retirement accounts. We compare results under the historical RMD age 70.5 rule, as well 
as RMDs at ages 72 and 75, and we also examine the impact of eliminating RMDs for retirees 
having account values below $100,000, known as the progressive RMD approach, as well as the 
complete elimination of the RMD.  
We show that delaying the RMD age would have little impact on peoples’ financial 
behavior during their worklives, including for expected savings patterns both inside and outside 
tax-qualified retirement accounts. Additionally, social security claiming behavior is almost 
unaffected. Nevertheless, more notable changes are evident during the retirement phase, depending 
on whether retirees have a bequest motive or not. For those lacking a bequest motive, even 
eliminating RMD rules would change very little. But for households having a bequest motive, the 
former RMD age 70.5 rule was quite restrictive, since such a household would prefer to make 
fewer withdrawals than required and use the 401(k) plans as a tool to transfer financial wealth to 
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the next generation. Raising the RMD age to 72 permits such a household to postpone account 
withdrawals and defer taxes for two years. We also show that delaying the RMD from 70 to 72 or 
even age 75 changes the timing of tax payments, but it hardly affects overall tax payments over 
the remaining lifecycle. This is due to a “catch up” effect, where lower tax payments early on in 
retirement are offset by higher tax payments later, due to having higher 401(k) values and larger 
taxable withdrawals. Under a progressive RMD, households intending to leave a bequest end up 
paying less tax over their lifetimes. Instead, they use the $100,000 exemption limit to transfer 
wealth to the next generation without fear of penalty taxes. This leads to lower tax payments, 
especially for the wealthiest 1% of taxpayers. 
 In sum, peoples’ behavior under alternative RMD rules will depend on the extent to which 
they desire to leave money to their heirs. This implies that financial institutions such as insurance 
companies and mutual funds offering retirement plans and investment advice would benefit from 
ascertaining their clients’ bequest intentions, before advising them about RMD strategies. Our 
conclusions will also interest professional financial planners guiding clients as they make 
retirement payout choices.18 Moreover, our results can inform policymakers considering 
legislation to raise and/or eliminate the RMD policy for 401(k) plan payouts.    
We note that our quantitative results regarding tax revenues should be interpreted with 
caution, since our microeconomic single-generation lifecycle model does not take into account 
potential macroeconomic effects that may arise with overlapping generations. Moreover, our 
model does not endogenize the impact of changes in RMD rules on the labor, financial, and goods 
markets. Nevertheless, since individual behaviors transfer to the macroeconomic level, our results 
mutatis mutandis indicate the direction of how changing RMD rules could affect the federal 
                                                            
18 Our previous work (Horneff 2020b) has also identified key ways in which deferred annuities can further lower 
retirees’ RMD payout obligations. 
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budget. Additionally, we are aware that our model posits that households make rational economic 
decisions, even though behavioral economists show that they sometimes do not. We leave this 
extension to future research, as there is no consensus regarding which behavioral aspects should 
be implemented in normative models and how. Nevertheless, to simultaneously demonstrate the 
impact of RMD policy changes on key household behaviors including consumption, work hours, 
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Figure 1: 401(k) Optimal Withdrawals minus RMD Rule Withdrawals 
 
        Column A: Deferring RMD Ages  Column B: Impact of Progressive RMD 
 
  Notes: The figures report average differences by age between optimal withdrawals predicted by the lifecycle model 
minus minimum withdrawals required by the corresponding RMD rule. In Column A, retirees lack a bequest motive 
and Column B, retirees have a bequest motive. Population outcomes are generated using 200,000 weighted simulation 
paths based on optimal feedback controls for the six subgroups (see weights in Table 1). For additional information 
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Figure 2: Probability Distribution of Optimal Withdrawals Percentages at Different Ages 
 











Notes: The figures depict the predicted probability distribution of withdrawals as fraction of retirement assets 
(withdrawal ratio) taken by retirees at age 75 (orange bars), 85 (blue bars), and 95 (yellow bars). Relative frequencies 
by withdrawal ratios are reported in 0.5% steps. The arrows reflect the RMD for those in the corresponding age group, 
as per the IRS uniform table. In Column A, retirees lack a bequest motive and Column B, retirees have a bequest 
motive. Population outcomes are generated using 200,000 weighted simulation paths based on optimal feedback 
controls from the lifecycle models for the six subgroups (see weights in Table 1). Results in the first row are based 
on the RMD-75 rule, and in the second row, the progressive RMD rule (i.e., RMD-75 & W>100K). For additional 























































































Figure 3: Expected Lifecycle Tax Payments under Various RMD Rules: Retirees Having a 
Bequest Motive 
 
Column A: Deferring RMD Ages               Column B: Impact of Progressive RMD 
  
Notes: The figures report summary statistics (upper rows = means, lower rows = 99% quantiles) of tax payments (including 
penalty taxes) for retirees with a bequest motive from age 70 until 100, under various RMD rules.  Column A illustrates the 
effect of changing only the RMD age (RMD-70, RMD-72, RMD-75), while Column B illustrates the impact of the progressive 
RMD approach (RMD-75 versus RMD-75 for account values above $100,000). Population outcomes are generated using 
200,000 weighted simulation paths based on optimal feedback controls for the six subgroups (see text and weights in Table 



























































Table 1: Model-generated Outcomes for Claiming Ages, Hours Worked, 401(k) and Other 
Assets, Consumption Flows 
 
  Column A: w/o bequest Column B: with bequest 
  
RMD-70 RMD-72 RMD-75 RMD-75 & 
W>100K 
RMD-70 RMD-72 RMD-75 RMD-75 & 
W>100K 
                  
1. Average Claiming Age 
 Age 62-70  64.9 64.9 64.9 64.9 65.3 65.3 65.4 65.4 
                  
2. Average Work Hours per Week 
Age 25-61 33.9 33.9 33.9 34.0 36.8 36.8 36.9 36.8 
                  
3. Average 401(k) Assets in  $000 
Age 25-61 101.3 101.3 100.3 100.2 131.7 132.3 131.1 131.8 
Age 62-90 72.9 71.9 73.1 72.9 107.9 109.0 108.6 109.2 
Age 91-100 6.1 5.9 6.1 6.1 33.1 33.3 33.4 42.9 
 
4. Average Non-Qualified Assets in $000 
Age 25-61 7.2 7.2 7.9 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.8 7.6 
Age 62-90 11.9 11.9 11.6 11.6 14.8 14.5 14.6 13.9 
Age 91-100 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 16.8 16.7 16.7 8.2 
                  
5. Average Consumption in $000 
Age 25-61 26.2 26.2 26.1 26.1 26.7 26.7 26.7 26.7 
Age 62-100 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 24.7 24.7 24.7 24.7 












Notes: We report average outcomes for the age 70 rule (RMD-70); the  age 72 rule (RMD-72); the age 75 rule (RMD 
-75); and the progressive RMD rule (RMD-75 & W>100K). Results in Column A (B) are for individuals without 
(with) a bequest motive. Averages are derived from 200,000 simulated lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls 
from the life cycle model using income profiles for six sex/education subgroups. Population averages use education 
weights for females (males): 61% +Coll; 28% HS; 11% <HS (57% +Coll; 30% HS; 13%<HS); weights for females 
(males) 49.28% (50.72%) of entire population. The baseline calibration uses the following parameters: risk aversion 
𝜌𝜌 = 5; time preference 𝛽𝛽 = 0.96; leisure preference 𝛼𝛼 =  1.3; results with a bequest motive assume 𝑏𝑏 = 2. 
Endogenous retirement ages 62-70 and social security benefits are based on average permanent income and the bend 
points in place in 2018. The risk premium for stocks returns is 5% and return volatility 18%; the risk free rate in the 







Table 2: Probability (%) of 401(k) Withdrawals Falling Below the RMD 
 
Column A: w/o bequest 
  


















<HS 2.8 2.5 2.1 0.0 12.5 11.8 10.8 0.0 
HS 4.2 3.9 3.5 0.0 10.8 10.2 9.2 0.1 
Coll+ 2.7 2.5 2.1 0.1 6.8 6.5 6.1 0.5 







Table 3: Lifetime Tax Payments from Age 70 to 100 under Various RMD Rules (in $000) 
  Panel A: w/o bequest 
  
RMD-70 RMD-72 RMD-75 RMD-75 & 
W>100K 
w/o RMD 
            
Mean  4.62 4.51 4.62 4.54 4.48 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
75% Quantile 0.30 0.25 0.17 0.00 0.00 
95% Quantile  19.21 18.39 19.57 19.09 18.65 
99% Quantile 112.08 110.80 109.95 110.66 107.47 
        
 
  Panel B: with bequest 
  
RMD-70 RMD-72 RMD-75 RMD-75 & 
W>100K 
w/o RMD 
            
Mean  5.08 5.13 5.04 4.93 4.94 
Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
75% Quantile 0.64 0.59 0.46 0.02 0.01 
95% Quantile  21.00 21.15 20.69 20.78 20.92 
99% Quantile  125.95 126.91  123.66 118.56 118.93 
        
 
  
Notes: This table reports the probability (%) that an individual with below high school (<HS), 
high school (HS) or at least college (Coll+) education will pay a penalty tax due to taking 401(k) 
withdrawals below those required by the RMD rule (conditional on survival). Results in Column 
A (B) are for individuals without (with) a bequest motive. Outcomes are generated using 200,000 
weighted simulation paths based on optimal feedback controls for the six subgroups- (see weights 
in Table 1). For additional information on parameters and calibrations see Table 1. Source: 
Authors’ calculations 
Notes: This table reports summary statistics for the sum of tax payments between ages 70 and 100 
(weighted by survival probabilities) for different RMD rules. Results are based on 200,000 simulated 
optimal lifecycles for six sex/education groups for households without (Panel A) and with a bequest 
motive (Panel B). For other parameters and calibrations, see Table 1. Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Online Appendix A: Wage rate estimation 
We calibrated the wage rate process using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) 1975-2015 from 
age 25 to 69.  Extreme observations below $5 per hour and above the 99th percentile are dropped. The wage 
rate values are expressed in $2015. During the worklife, each individual’s labor income profile has 
deterministic, permanent, and transitory components with uncorrelated and normally distributed shocks 
according to 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡) ~𝑁𝑁(−0.5𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2,  𝜎𝜎𝑛𝑛2) and 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙(𝑈𝑈𝑡𝑡) ~𝑁𝑁(−0.5𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2,  𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢2). These are estimated separately by sex 
and three educational levels: less than High School (<HS), High School graduate (HS), and with at least 
some college (Coll+). We use a second order polynomial in age and dummies for employment status to 
estimate the deterministic component using the regression function: 
 ln (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 ) = 𝛽𝛽1 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽2 ∗ 𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦2 +  𝛽𝛽5 ∗ 𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦 + 𝛽𝛽𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎𝑠𝑠 ∗ 𝑤𝑤𝑇𝑇𝑤𝑤𝑎𝑎 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑑𝑑, (A1) 
where log (𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖,𝑦𝑦) is the natural log of wage at time y for individual i, age is the age of the individual divided 
by 100, ES is the individual’s employment status, and wave dummies control for year-specific shocks.  For 
employment status, we include three groups depending on work hours per week as follows:  part-time 
worker (≤ 20 hours), full-time worker (< 20 & ≤ 40 hours) and overtime worker (< 40 hours). OLS 
regression results for the wage rate process equations are provided in Table A1.   
 
To estimate the variances of the permanent and transitory components, we follow Hubener at al. (2016).  
We calculate the difference of the observed log wage and the regression result, and we take the difference 
of these differences across different lengths of time d. For individual i, the residual is: 
 
 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑑𝑑 = ∑ (𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡+𝑠𝑠)𝑑𝑑−1𝑠𝑠=0   + 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+𝑑𝑑 − 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡. (A2) 
 
We then regress the 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓𝑓𝚤𝚤,𝑑𝑑2  
����� on the lengths of time d between waves and a constant: 
 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑 = 𝛽𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑑𝑑 + 𝛽𝛽2 ⋅ 2 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑑𝑑, (A3) 





Table A1: Regression results for wage rates 
Coefficient 
 
Male <HS Male HS Male +Coll Female <HS Female HS Female +Coll 
 Deterministic              
Age/100 3.161*** 5.972*** 9.092*** 1.256*** 2.767*** 4.731*** 
  (0.108) (0.049) (0.070) (0.110) (0.046) (0.072) 
Age²/10000 -3.329*** -6.416*** -9.351*** -1.339*** -2.915*** -4.960*** 
  (0.130) (0.062) (0.089) (0.131) (0.059) (0.094) 
Part-time work -0.109*** -0.153*** -0.0826*** -0.0858*** -0.129*** -0.0847*** 
  (0.020) (0.009) (0.011) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) 
Over-time work 0.00412 0.0506*** 0.0949*** 0.0158*** 0.0748*** 0.106*** 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
Constant 1.807*** 1.435*** 1.151*** 2.051*** 2.015*** 1.938*** 
  (0.042) (0.012) (0.015) (0.037) (0.011) (0.017) 
              
Observations 48,762 327,305 293,386 31,788 290,597 225,211 
R-squared 0.069 0.102 0.147 0.032 0.044 0.092 
              
Permanent 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.019*** 
  (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.001) 
Transitory 0.028*** 0.031** 0.041*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.038*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
              
Observations 28,359 175,247 140,984 20,863 176,304 123,145 
R-squared 0.214 0.283 0.307 0.146 0.255 0.264 
 
Notes: Regression results for the natural logarithm of wage rates (in $2015) are based in on information in the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for persons age 25-69 in waves 1975-2015. Independent variables include age 
and age-squared, and dummies for part time work (≤20 hours per week) and overtime work (≥ 40 hours per week). 




Online Appendix B: Modeling taxes and retirement accounts  
We embed a US-type tax system for workers having access to a qualified tax-deferred retirement account 
(TDA). All values are in $2018 and relevant amounts are inflation adjusted yearly. The worker pays federal 
income taxes on taxable income which is a complex function on labor income (minus housing costs), social 
security benefits and returns from investments in bonds and stocks.19 Contributions 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡  (up to 𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡 = $18,500) 
to the TDA reduce and withdrawals 𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 from the TDA increase taxable income. For taxation of social 
security (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1) benefits after retirement, we use the following rules: when the retiree’s combined income20 
is between $25,000 and $34,000 (over $34,000), 50% (85%) of benefits are part of taxable income. Finally, 
a general standardized deduction 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷 = $12,000) reduces the worker’s taxable income, which is given by: 
 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = max�max�𝑆𝑆𝑡𝑡 ⋅ (𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡+1 − 1) + 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 ⋅ �𝑊𝑊𝑓𝑓 − 1�;  0� + 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1(1 − ℎ𝑡𝑡) +
               𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 − min(𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡;𝐷𝐷𝑡𝑡) − 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷; 0�.  
 
(B1) 
In line with US federal income tax, our progressive tax system has 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,7 brackets (IRS 2015) defined 
by a lower and an upper bound of taxable income 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 ∈ [𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖 ,𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖] and determine a marginal tax rate 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡.  
 
In 2018, the marginal taxes rates for a single household were 10% from $0 to $9,525, 12% from $9,225 to 
$38,700, 22% from $38,701 to $82,500, 24% from $82,501 to $157,500, 32% from $157,500 to $200,000 
35% from $200,001 to $500,000 and 37% above $500,000 (see IRS 2018). Based on these tax brackets 
(deflated to the year 2015), the dollar amount of income taxes payable is given by: 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = (𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓7
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏6 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏7�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓6
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏5 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏6�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓5
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏4 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏5�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓4
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏3 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏4�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓3
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡
+ �(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2) ⋅ 1�𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3>𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2� + (𝑢𝑢𝑏𝑏2 − 𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏2) ⋅ 1�𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡+1𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡≥𝑙𝑙𝑏𝑏3�� ⋅ 𝑓𝑓2
𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡









where, for 𝐴𝐴 ⊆ 𝑋𝑋, the indicator function 1𝐴𝐴 → {0, 1} is defined as: 
1𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = �
1 | 𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐴𝐴
0 | 𝑥𝑥 ∉ 𝐴𝐴 .
             (B3) 
Additionally, before retirement (𝑡𝑡 = K) the worker pays payroll taxes proportional to labor income: tax 
rate social security 6.2% (up to a limit of 128,400); Medicare tax rate 1.45% and city/state tax rate 4% 
(without limit). Overall payroll taxes are modelled as 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 6.2% · max(𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 , 128,400) + 5.45% · 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡. 
and 𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑡𝑡 = 5.45% · 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 after retirement 𝑡𝑡 ≥ 𝐾𝐾. Finally, penalty taxes of 10% on early TDA-withdrawals 
prior to age 59 ½ (𝑡𝑡 = 36), and 50% on non-compliant RMD withdrawals are charged. 
                                                            
19 For simplicity, we do not distinguish between the different taxation of dividends and capital gains on stocks. Instead, 
we assume that all investment income (if positive) is taxed at the same rate as labor income at the source. 




Online Appendix C: Social Security Claiming Patterns for Males and Females, and 401(k) 
Asset Values (model vs data)  
  
Notes: The top panel compare expected claiming rates generated by our life cycle models and empirical 
claiming rates reported by the US Social Security Administration for the year 2015 (without disability). The 
lower panel compares expected account balances generated by the life cycle model versus empirical 401(k) 
account balances across the US population. Empirical account balance data are from the Employee Benefit 
Research Institute (2017); age groups referred to as 20s, 30s, 40s, 50s, and 60s denote average values for 
persons age 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-69. Expected values are calculated from 100,000 simulated 
lifecycles based on optimal feedback controls for each of six subgroups. Results for the entire female (male) 
population are computed using income profile three education levels: 61% +Coll; 28% HS; 11% <HS (57% 
+Coll; 30% HS; 13%<HS); weights for females (males) 49.28% (50.72%) of entire population. Parameters 
used for the baseline calibration are as follows: risk aversion 𝜌𝜌 = 5; time preference 𝛽𝛽 = 0.96; leisure 
preference 𝛼𝛼 =  1.2; endogenous retirement age 62-70. Social security benefits are based on average 
permanent income and the bend points in place in 2015; minimum required withdrawals from 401(k) plans 
are based on life expectancy using the IRS-Uniform Lifetime Table in 2015; tax rules for 401(k) plans are as 
of 2015 as described above. The risk premium for stocks returns is 5% and return volatility 18%; the risk free 
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